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Abstract  
This paper traces the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and analyses the protests within the realm of what 
is referred to as ‘contentious politics’. In its examination of the protests it aims to contribute to 
contextualising contentious politics in Turkey, a country located on the cross-roads of Europe and 
Asia and along the heated region of the Middle East, which has been transformed radically through 
contentious politics since 2011. By assessing the Gezi Park movement within its historical and 
sociological context I aim to pursue a textual analysis of contentious politics in the form of the cries 
uttered and voices heard in Istanbul and beyond during this social protest. 
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Exordium 
“You never change things by fighting the 
existing reality. To change something, build a 
new model that makes the existing model 
obsolete”. 1  The Gezi Park movement 
embraced this concept in pursuit of 
transforming Turkish contentious politics. The 
movement succeeded in successfully 
redefining the social roles of the various 
oppressed social groups by Turkey’s president 
and prime-minister during the Gezi Park 
protests, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party, 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The 
Gezi Park protests started in May 2013 and 
were an unprecedented series of 
demonstrations staged by the Gezi Park 
movement throughout Turkey, especially in 
Istanbul.2 Particularly, on 27 May at midnight 
bulldozers and demolition vehicles entered the 
Gezi Park, located in the centre of Istanbul, to 
uproot the trees and pedestrianise it so that the 
former Taksim military barracks can be 
reconstructed and serve as mosque and 
shopping mall. However, a group of young 
environmental activists had camped in the park 
and was preventing the vehicles from 
demolishing the park. 3  Four days later, the 
police attempted to violently escort them by 
force, but forced eviction failed. Soon, 
thousands of people from across Turkey 
gathered in the Gezi Park and the surrounding 
areas to protest in solidarity with the 
environmental activists taking up positions in 
and around the park.4 
Before long, the Gezi Park became a social 
platform for the promotion of free speech, 
through which protesters would express their 
grievances against the government on a broad 
spectrum of concerns. In the course of the early 
stand-off the government was forced to recall 
the police forces, and while the protesters 
remained at the park for two more weeks they 
initiated a whole new social movement aiming 
to politically combat the government. 5  The 
ideologically diverse protesters formed various 
groups that comprised the social movement.6 
The movement’s heterogeneous composition 
was perceived as its Achilles heel by the 
government and thus, it tried to propagate 
against it in order to disintegrate it. AKP 
politician and minister of education stated that: 
[i]n five days, we achieved uniting 
contending social groups under a fog 
against us. Normally these fractions 
cannot come together, for it was 
something that the Parliamentary 
opposition has worked on for years. 
When the fog disperses, however, 
these contending identities will be 
shocked when they realize that they 
are sitting next to each other.7 
However, his prediction was far from true. 
Despite their stark ideological differences, the 
protesters shared major common objectives 
which were directed against Erdogan’s 
conservative Islamic agenda. The women 
joined the Gezi Park movement to resist the 
enduring oppression of their personal life and 
social role. 8  Additionally, the football fans 
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joined the movement to protest against police 
brutality and Erdogan’s interference in sport 
and football club affairs. 9  Various minority 
groups joined the movement, each of which 
arguably had their own experiences of 
oppression by the AKP. The government’s 
corrupt practices, the undermining of the 
democratic processes and civil society, the 
interference in citizens’ personal and social 
daily life, the oppression of homosexuality and 
the persecution of transgender sex-workers, 
the environmental degradation, the mass 
deportations of migrants from the 
gecekondular, the oppression of the Alevis and 
the Kurds, censorship, and the imprisonment 
of journalists, leftists, and other perceived 
political enemies of the political order were 
only some of the reasons that instigated the 
Gezi Park movement that united the various 
groups against Erdogan’s authoritarian 
policies. The Gezi Park movement was a form 
of collective action that drastically 
transformed Turkish contentious politics. 
This paper, therefore, is positioned within the 
discourse of contentious politics. It aspires to 
contribute to contextualising contentious 
politics in Turkey, a country located in the 
heated region of the Middle East which has 
been transformed radically through 
contentious politics since 2011, by assessing 
the Gezi Park movement within its historical 
and sociological context. 10  Specifically, it 
performs a textual analysis on contentious 
politics in the form of an extensive literature 
review. The research aims to assess how the 
Gezi Park movement’s dynamics transformed 
contentious politics in Turkey. Dynamics in 
this paper refers to the behaviour of groups and 
the individual interaction that stimulates 
change within a social system. 11  It 
concentrates on two ideologically dissimilar 
empirical cases, namely the women’s group 
and Istanbul United, to accomplish its aim. 
In terms of methodology, this study employs 
Tilly’s historical sociology theory to examine 
the empirical cases. Initially, it conducts a 
critical literature review on contentious 
politics through four other prominent 
theoretical frameworks that are pertinent to 
studying the Gezi Park movement’s dynamics: 
Namely, the theory of political opportunity, 
Hobbes’ theory on collective action, Rosler’s 
feminist theory, and Foucault’s theory of 
sexuality. Subsequently, for further insights, it 
critically analyses Tilly’s historical sociology 
theoretical framework which is based upon the 
following three elements: Campaigns, 
repertoires, and displays of worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment (WUNC). It 
concludes that Tilly’s theory provides the most 
effective theoretical framework for assessing 
Gezi Park movement’s dynamics. 
I argue that the redefinition of the social role of 
the groups that comprised the Gezi Park 
movement evolved the dynamics of Turkish 
contentious politics by transforming social 
movements into effective platforms for social 
collectivity. Furthermore, the empirical cases’ 
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analysis evinces that the Gezi Park 
movement’s groups, regardless of their 
ideological orientation, can generate 
transformative effects on Turkey’s contentious 
politics by redefining their social roles. In this, 
they conform to Tilly’s historical sociology 
theoretical framework’s three criteria. 
In the first part of this paper I will conduct a 
review of the literature on contentious politics 
theory. The first section will review and 
critically assesses the applicability of the 
aforementioned theories, while the second 
section reviews and critically assesses the 
applicability of Tilly’s theory which will later 
be employed for assessing the empirical cases’ 
dynamics. The second part of the paper will 
apply Tilly’s theory on the women’s group to 
assess its dynamics’ effect on Turkish 
contentious politics. This discussion is divided 
into five sections, beginning with a discussion 
of the situation for women in Turkey in an 
attempt to understand their motives for joining 
the Gezi Park movement. The second section 
assesses the campaigns of the women’s group. 
The third section assesses its repertoires and 
the fourth assesses its displays of WUNC. The 
last section will assess the cultural evolution of 
the group’s social role along with its effect on 
Turkish contentious politics.  
The following section applies Tilly’s theory on 
the football fans’ group, known as Istanbul 
United, to assess its dynamics on Turkish 
contentious politics. This section is also 
divided into five parts. Finally, in the epilogue, 
I will air my reflections on the protests and 
discuss my findings in greater detail. 
 
Contentious Politics 
Theory and the Gezi Park 
Movement 
“A social movement that only moves people is 
merely a revolt. A movement that changes both 
people and institutions is a revolution”, uttered 
Martin Luther King Jr. to denote that a social 
movement’s dynamics determine its very 
substance. Among other disruptive techniques 
for expressing civil disobedience, revolts and 
revolutions are two typical forms of 
contentious politics in which social 
movements often engage in pursuit of political 
change. Charles Tilly, a prominent historical 
sociologist described as “the founding father of 
21st century sociology”,12 defined contentious 
politics as “interactions in which actors make 
claims bearing on someone else’s interest, in 
which governments appear either as targets, 
initiators of claims, or third parties”.13  
The term ‘new social movement’ theory is 
rooted in the ideas of social movements which 
was first developed in the 1960s, 
encompassing a broad spectrum of actions 
ranging from simple boycotting to forceful 
demonstrations.14 During the global escalation 
of the American revolts of 1968, it was realised 
that the old social movements of the workers 
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and the other exploited classes which aspired 
state power were obsolete and ineffective. 
Concepts such as new social movements 
emerged, which provided for autonomy, self-
expression and a comprehensive critique of the 
postindustrial society. 15  The extensive 
analytical research conducted on new social 
movements revolutionised the overall 
methodology for studying contentious politics; 
researchers now examined social movements 
methodically and comprehensively through a 
synthesis of various perspectives. 16  Shortly, 
the term was extended to incorporate different 
kinds of political activities and demonstrations 
that were protesting for diverse purposes 
including gender equality, environmental 
protection, rights of minorities and migration, 
war prevention, and international solidarity 
among others.17 
The Gezi Park movement, representative of 
new social movements, engaged in contentious 
politics intensely and it was a particularly 
remarkable social movement not only 
quantitatively (for its unprecedented size), but 
also qualitatively – for its distinctively 
heterogeneous composition. Its composition is 
a focal characteristic, among the movement’s 
other features, which fostered the high 
dynamics for the emergence of a collective 
action of such magnitude.  
The works of Tarrow’s, Meyer’s, and 
McAdam’s successively, Hobbes’ theory of 
collective action, Rosler’s feminist theory, and 
Foucault’s theory of sexuality, have all 
informed this research. However, Tilly’s work 
on historical sociology provides the most 
effective theoretical framework for assessing 
the aforementioned dynamics.  
The Forerunners of Collective 
Action’s Dynamics: A Critical 
Assessment 
 
Political Opportunity 
The theory of ‘political opportunity’, mainly 
developed by Tarrow, McAdam, and Meyer, is 
exceptionally prominent for analysing social 
movements. Tarrow argues that political 
opportunities for the formation of social 
movements are created by incentives, 
consistent or temporary, which citizens may 
exploit or forgo.18 McAdam theorised the four 
key dynamic elements of political 
opportunities that lead to contentious politics 
through social action as: the political system’s 
openness, the ruling elite’s stability, the ruling 
elite’s alliances, and the tendency for 
governmental repression. 19  Accordingly, the 
Gezi Park movement exploited both consistent 
and temporary incentives; the consistent 
incentives included Erdogan’s authoritarian 
policies while the temporary aspect refers to 
the Gezi Park’s pedestrianisation on which the 
Ottoman Taksim military barracks would be 
rebuilt. These incentives evinced Erdogan’s 
intentions for civil repression and thus were 
exploited by the citizens through the Gezi Park 
movement’s formation. Moreover, the latter 
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element of McAdam’s political opportunity 
structure, namely the tendency for 
governmental repression, was an enduring 
characteristic of Erdogan’s regime which 
encouraged also minorities to join the 
movement to resist to social discrimination by 
rallying behind the environmental activists 
who initiated the Gezi Park movement.  
Nonetheless, the theory of political 
opportunity fails to make a cogent case for the 
movement’s dynamics. The aforementioned 
temporary incentives were not the reason but 
merely the excuse for the Gezi Park 
movement’s emergence and the consistent 
incentives had not led to the formation of 
notable social movements previously. 
Specifically, AKP’s conservatism has been 
evident since its rise to power in 2002, and 
since then the liberties of women, especially 
their right for self-determination, has been 
systematically repressed, with the government 
promoting the idea of motherhood as a way of 
encouraging women to have babies and boost 
the country’s population. 20  While such 
government policies as banning abortions, 
because they impeded its demographic goals, 
did lead to complaints and protest, this was 
nowhere equivalent to the rise of a social 
movement. Moreover, McAdam’s remaining 
three elements of political opportunity 
structure are not readily evident either. The 
relative openness of the institutionalised 
political system was no crucial feature of the 
movement, the ruling political elite and agenda 
was stable, and also stable were its alliances 
with its salient stakeholders including the 
religious institutions and allied countries. 
Therefore, the theory of political opportunity 
cannot be employed to effectively examine the 
Gezi Park movement dynamics. 
 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that, 
according to Meyer’s and Tarrow’s theory of 
political opportunity, modern representative 
democracies ought to integrate social 
movements to the extent that they become 
‘societies of movements’ for mainly three 
reasons.21 Firstly, protests are not considered 
sporadic anarchical phenomena anymore but a 
form of civil expression. Secondly, new social 
movements do not constitute a direct threat to 
governments but, in stark contrast, collective 
actions objectively reflect the society’s pulse 
because they are a mosaic of the social fabric 
produced through the synthesis of a broad 
spectrum of perspectives. Lastly, the 
institutionalisation of social movements can 
transform their allegedly aggressive character 
into conciliatory political claims. In the light of 
the latter observation, when studying societies 
of movements, the social movements should 
be examined through the analytical tools 
employed for examining political parties. 
Three empirical observations were employed 
by Meyer and Tarrow to support the claim for 
the institutionalization of social movements.22 
Firstly, contemporary protests are relatively 
routine; thus, both movements and authorities, 
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arguably, share standards of action and 
acknowledge the dangers of deviating from 
them. Secondly, the government’s approval of 
the movements’ claims is discretionary but 
comes with consequences. Thirdly, the 
institutionalised actors inevitably adapt their 
social discourse in order to, ultimately, comply 
with the standards of conventional political 
behaviour. 
 
Clearly, this approach of political opportunity 
is incompatible with the Gezi Park movement 
due to the theory’s assumptions, the foremost 
being that Turkey is not a society of 
movements; on the contrary, even though 
Turkey is typically a democracy, protests are 
remarkably sporadic. Moreover, most groups 
that comprised the movement cannot be treated 
as political parties because the groups’ 
structure and motives were incomparable to 
those of political parties. Additionally, the 
Gezi Park movement was not an 
institutionalised movement of routine nature 
and lacked a shared agenda; the football fans 
often acted autonomously in pursuit of clashes 
with the police. Lastly, the movement did not 
adapt its tactics or communication with the 
government to the standards of conventional 
political behaviour. Consequently, Meyer’s 
and Tarrow’s approach is not pertinent to an 
analysis of the Gezi Park movement. Overall, 
while the theory of political opportunities 
could offer an interesting argument for the 
Gezi Park movement’s dynamics, it is rife with 
incompatibilities in the incentives, the key 
elements, and the assumptions upon which it is 
built. 
 
Collective Action 
According to the Hobbesian theory of 
‘collective action’, motives are purely egoistic 
and thus, collectivism serves essentially as the 
means for pursuing numerous self-interests 
since the communal notion of society bears 
little value other than the mass pursuit of 
individual objectives.23 For Hobbes, the sole 
drive of human behaviour is ultimately the 
individual’s urge for personal benefit and 
hence humans will always act hedonistically, 
videlicet they will struggle for maximising 
their pleasure and avoid limitations and pain.24 
Accordingly, even though rational people take 
into consideration extrinsic parameters when 
making decisions, they do so because these 
parameters might impact their self-interests;25 
consequently, their decision remains purely 
dependent upon their self-interest. Hobbes’ 
theory attributes actions to the satisfaction of 
the individual’s psychological egoism and thus 
treats people as egoists. Hobbes’ morality is 
materialistic; according to Hobbes’ normative 
position, actions are driven by primitive drives 
like passion, not some idealistic shared values. 
Notably, he denies not only the existence of 
universally accepted morals but, interestingly, 
he asserts that everyone has different morals 
which concur only partially with others’ 
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principles. Thus, the only prerequisite for 
commitment is narrow self-interest.26 
 
Undoubtedly, numerous protesters with 
diverse moralities joined the Gezi Park 
movement to pursue their personal self-
interests. Certainly, each group had its own 
reasons for demonstrating and, evidently, the 
movement’s heterogeneous composition also 
indicates this diversity of motives. 
Specifically, even within the groups 
themselves divergent goals were often pursued 
during the protests. For instance, the feminists 
had different goals from the sex-workers 
among the women. The feminists 
demonstrated for control over their bodies, 
including their right to abortion, while sex-
workers remonstrated for social dignity and for 
proudly claiming their right to practice their 
profession without being targeted for social 
and political exclusion by the government; 
interestingly, the sex-workers asserted that 
their job is not immoral and, on the contrary, 
immoral are the politicians.27 Respectively, the 
football fans’ goals varied considerably too. 
Some fans simply perceived the Gezi Park 
movement just as an opportunity to wage their 
vendetta against the police by clashing with 
them while others, namely the Carsi of 
Besiktas, had political motives. The Carsi are 
leftist anarchists with an enduring tradition in 
intense sociopolitical activities who advocate 
working class activism and they in effect led 
the entire group of football fans during the 
protests. 28  Overall, Hobbes’ theory of 
collective action is indeed pertinent to the Gezi 
Park protests since members of the same group 
occasionally had different drives and thus, 
advocated for rights which often differed from 
their group’s agenda Nonetheless, the 
movement was predominantly comprised of 
social groups whose agendas addressed 
communal objectives, not merely egoistic. 
Undeniably, the protesters’ motives were 
personal but the dynamics of the entire 
collective action were not since, when it was 
required, the personal claims were abandoned 
for the movement’s sake. An indicative 
example is that of the football fans for whom 
the prevalence of masculinity against the 
women and the LGBT group was a dominant 
characteristic but they willingly suppressed it 
when they realised its detrimental effect on the 
entire movement. At first the fans employed 
sexist language against these groups but 
afterwards they apologised and thereafter the 
fans treated them respectfully.29  
 
Feminism: The Personal is Political 
A similar theme, emphasising the individual’s 
autonomy, was central in Martha Rosler’s 
feminist theory too, namely, ‘the personal is 
political’. According to this normative theory, 
the underlying motives behind protesting 
individuals or groups are personal but they also 
have a political dimension because they 
suggest social collective action. Furthermore, 
this approach treats societies as the synthesis 
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of diverse citizens who ought to determine 
their own lifestyles and thus, structure a 
dynamic society based upon the citizens’ 
norms without being restricted by systemic 
forces. Therefore, societal progress is 
determined by a degree of personal autonomy 
citizens can enjoy in their daily life.30 
 
This theory is pertinent to the Gezi Park 
movement. As aforementioned in the 
Hobbesian theory on collective action, even 
though the protesting individuals and groups 
had their personal motives for demonstrating, 
they all resented the government’s policies 
which aimed at imposing a particular mode of 
living on society. Precisely, these interventions 
instigated the protesters’ massive collective 
action for their right for self-determination 
without being socially excluded from a society 
which is artificially created by the government 
for them. 
 
However, despite the pertinence of Rosler’s 
theory to the Gezi Park movement, its 
applicability is drastically limited by its scope. 
The theory emerged during the feminist 
movement of the 1970s and thus focalises on 
women. The theory’s ‘personal’ aspect 
revolves around the traditional role of women 
within family and society, and the sexism they 
are subjected to by social institutions like 
governments and cultures. Therefore, Rosler’s 
feminist theory’s application would be limited 
only to the empirical case of the women and 
could not address the football fans because 
they were principally men and they did not 
undergo sexism; in stark contrast, they 
practiced sexism.31 
 
Sexuality 
Foucault’s theory of ‘sexuality’ emphasises 
the control of the body, masculinity, and 
femininity. Foucault argues that since the 17th 
century people have lived in the era of 
repressed sexuality, during which sexuality 
was initially repressed verbally (through 
logos) in pursuit of societies in which sex 
would only exist for reproduction and 
socioeconomic purposes. 32  Subsequently, 
citizens are indoctrinated into believing that 
any form of sexuality or sexual relations which 
does not aim for reproduction are superfluous 
and thus redundant.33 According to Foucault, 
from the early 17th century until the end of the 
18th century the marital sexual relationship 
prevailed because it was prescribed by the 
Canon Law of Christianity which dictated 
urban laws, among other societal aspects of 
life, and reproached nonconforming actions as 
reprehensible. Markedly, reprehensible actions 
were also deemed sinful and so extramarital 
sexual actions were considered sins. 
Moreover, there was no hierarchical 
distinction among sins. Therefore, in the 
Church’s pursuit for control of the human body 
and self-determination, adultery was 
considered an equally grave sin alongside 
incest and sodomy.34 
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In the 19th century the Church’s influence 
deteriorated dramatically. Consequently, the 
repression of sexuality was drastically 
transformed. It was now based upon bloodlines 
and it was extended to most social institutions 
under a discriminatory ideology. The state 
firmly dictated the structure and the conditions 
of marriage, family, property as well as the 
issues concerning the citizens’ body, daily life, 
and behaviour in order to ensure that their 
bloodlines remained unspoiled and their race 
pure. Foucault’s theory of sexuality as a 
political cause can serve as the theoretical 
framework for examining state policies and 
government-encouraged physical control of 
the body which promotes heterosexuality, 
reproduction, and the traditional family 
structure and roles. The concept of masculinity 
and femininity is a dominant characteristic of 
Foucault’s theory and is very pertinent to this 
study’s empirical cases. However, proceeding 
with the application of the theory of sexuality 
on the Gezi Park movement requires further 
investigation. The women’s group only 
instrumentalised sexuality as a political 
weapon against the government when the 
feminists reproved the insults against 
Erdogan’s son as an offspring of a sex-worker, 
and the sex-workers attempts to humiliate 
politicians by asserting that their children 
would never be politicians. 35  Furthermore, 
even though the football fans often practiced 
sexism against the police and sometimes 
against the LGBT group and the women, their 
underlying motives were not gender-based. 
Therefore, sexuality was not reflective of their 
dynamics or motives, but sexism was merely a 
distinctive characteristic of their vocabulary, 
even among themselves, and was later 
abandoned through their interaction with other 
groups. 36  Even though Foucault’s theory is 
indeed pertinent to the Gezi Park movement, 
its applicability would only be superficial 
because sexuality was not decisive or the 
dominant characteristic of its dynamics. 
 
Overall, even though these four theories are 
indeed pertinent to the Gezi Park movement’s 
dynamics, they do not constitute a cogent 
argument for effectively assessing them.  
Historical Sociology 
“War made the state, and the state made war”37 
uttered the historical sociologist Charles Tilly 
to denote that the key reason behind the 
emergence of strife, like the new social 
movements, is that although they do not aspire 
to state power, political power is essential in 
achieving their mission, and thus they engage 
in contentious politics.38 Tilly’s definition of 
contentious politics refers to actors’ 
interactions for interest and can delineate 
effectively not only the Gezi Park movement’s 
dynamics but the dynamics of Erdogan’s 
policies too – these being in summary, the 
AKP’s conservative agenda of invigorating 
Islam, infringing civil liberties by restricting 
alcohol and smoking, and intervening in the 
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citizens’ daily lives with the patrimonial 
justification of safeguarding them from 
malevolent temptations. 39  Moreover, the 
government rigorously undermined the state’s 
democratic legitimacy because it engaged in 
contentious politics by inciting social 
upheavals to advance its own interests. The 
state security forces treated discriminatorily 
specific groups, predominantly ethnic 
minorities, and instrumentalised social groups 
in order to induce protests which of course 
served to strengthen the praetorian vanguard 
for the regime’s security and the protection of 
its interests. 
 
According to Tilly, such regimes vitiate the 
country’s public political life and they can be 
overthrown either through struggles in the elite 
or social struggles via massive 
demonstrations. 40  Tilly’s theory attempts to 
establish social movements’ genesis according 
to their historical context by defining their 
multiple sociological dimensions. Therefore, 
he argues that the contemporary perception for 
the formation of contemporary social 
movements as the citizens’ resistance to 
authority is simply a time-specific perception 
of the modern era and thus it is subject to 
change. 41  Nevertheless, contemporary social 
movements have been considered equivalent 
to collective action, regardless of their 
organisational structure. According to 
Seferiadis, collective action is not personal, 
experimental, expressive or a-political (i.e., 
irrelevant to the community), but is people 
acting collectively, subjects without access to 
political resources and, therefore, deprived of 
involvement in substantive negotiations. 42 
However, Tilly defined social movements 
through deduction in an attempt to emphasise 
that social movements are not merely popular 
collective actions, nor confined in their 
constituting institutions and networks, and are 
not just historical subjects. 43  Yet, social 
movements have specific, coherent, and 
evolving history of their interactions, policies, 
and practices which is three centuries old and 
whose inception concurs with journalism’s rise 
and the invention of the printing press.44 
 
In pursuit of assessing the dynamics of 
collective action through a historico-
sociological theoretical framework, Tilly 
elaborately deciphered the subject of social 
movements into three fundamental elements: 
campaigns, repertoires and displays of 
WUNC. 45  Tilly’s theory of historical 
sociology is remarkably prominent and has 
been employed widely across the field of 
contentious politics.46  The repertoires are of 
modern collective actions and rituals.47 These 
could refer to such activities as the creation of 
organisations, the use of media, 
demonstrations, parades, riots and the 
distribution of leaflets.48 Tilly’s conception of 
repertoire induces the characteristics of 
predictability, repetition, and relative 
standardisation of the acceptable actions 
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performed by a movement’s membership. 49 
Tilly treats the displays of WUNC, as the 
required actions and the behaviour that the 
individuals who comprise a social movement 
should possess. 50  Through the concept of 
worthiness, Tilly denotes the required 
solemnity of the protesters, especially the 
leading individuals, who should be decent, 
elegantly dressed, presentable, and involve 
women, children, and important people in their 
mission. Through unity, he denotes the 
concordant bonds, attitudes, and behaviours 
that indicate their solidarity such as wearing 
uniforms and badges, holding banners, 
marching in synchronised stride, and using 
symbolic language such as particular songs 
and slogans. The concept of numbers refers to 
the quantitative ‘volume’ of the participants, 
the collection of signatures for demands, 
messages from supporters, demonstrating 
protesters, and all the elements that relate to the 
movement’s size in general. The concept of 
commitment represents the degree of the 
protesters’ selfless contribution; commitment 
is expressed by attending gatherings even in 
bad weather, by involving old or disabled 
people, and through donations among other 
deeds. 51  In accordance with Seferiadis’ 
aforementioned conception of contemporary 
collective action, Tilly treats contemporary 
social movements as any collective action that 
combines campaigns, repertoires, and 
displays, three elements that are commonly 
found in modern collective actions. 52 
Therefore, virtually any social demand could 
be successful if the requirements for these 
three elements are effectively met. The 
enduring claims, successful use of media, 
effective mass mobilisation, strategically 
aligned behaviours, and solidarity are pivotal 
characteristics for fostering the dynamics of a 
successful social movement which can be 
legitimate in the public and the political 
spheres.   
 
Arguably, the Gezi Park movement is an 
indicative model of effective collective action 
because it employed most of these 
characteristics relatively effectively. It 
promoted specific demands which were 
expressed through several channels of 
communications, were endorsed by every 
participating group, and massively mobilised 
the public to dynamically assert their rights. 
Overall, Tilly’s historical sociology 
approach’s emphasis on the political nature of 
social movements encourages one to consider 
them as simply an unconventional form of 
political action. Furthermore, this approach 
provides the analytical tools for assessing the 
structural dynamics of social movements by 
treating social movements as rational social 
enterprises that operate within a political 
market and manage their resources in pursuit 
of clearly defined and measurable goals. 
Moreover, the selection of the appropriate 
means of action depends upon the 
effectiveness of the actors’ actions and the 
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nature of the power groups. The allocation of 
resources to a social movement’s actors 
typically invigorates their dynamics and 
enhances their effectiveness. However, other 
parameters affect, and often limit, the 
dynamics of groups within a social movement, 
including their organisational structure, the 
nature of their elites, their degree of 
institutionalisation within the political system, 
their level of autonomy, and the groups’ 
individual objectives, priorities and public 
endorsement. For these reasons, the leaders of 
groups or institutions, the trade unions, the 
groups with strong financial resources, the 
large groups, and the groups with direct access 
to the political system and the administrative 
mechanisms hold influential positions within 
contentious politics. Furthermore, Tilly 
highlights the increasing effect of new 
technologies when assessing the dynamics of 
social movements. 53  Even though new 
technologies are characterised by efficiency 
because they reduce the mobilisation’s costs 
through mass texting, emails, etc., they are 
often not widely applicable because of their 
limited accessibility to some citizens and thus 
can rarely be the sole channels of 
communication. Nevertheless, even though the 
participation of the privileged can sometimes 
compromise the unprivileged citizens, such 
instruments are indeed essential for managing 
massive social movements. 
 
The means of action are decisive factors for 
turning a social movement into a disruptive 
revolution that changes people and institutions. 
To achieve the dynamics to pursue this 
purpose, most social movements of the 21st 
century strive to develop a socially constructed 
identity which aspires for international 
collectivity. 54  Therefore, international social 
coalitions that support or oppose international 
institutions (e.g. NATO, IMF) and 
international objectives (e.g. war prevention) 
are proliferating dramatically, especially in 
concerns regarding human rights. 
Nevertheless, the inadvertent enlargement of 
social movements engenders notable risks, 
stemming mainly from their decentralised 
management, such as opportunities for 
rebellious separatists and the detachment of the 
movement’s elite from the protesting 
members.55 Additionally, Tilly argues that the 
internationalisation of social movements will 
eventually lead to their professionalisation and 
so can affect both positively and negatively the 
democratic procedures of the involved 
countries.56 The progress of social movements 
is dependent on the exploitation of the 
emerging political opportunities arising from 
societal demands. 57  Societal demands on 
policy areas that attract public attention 
threaten governments and thus tend to 
discourage collaboration with the political 
system and influential groups. Therefore, the 
social movements that deal with high-profile 
policy areas are considered more threatening 
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and encounter closed political opportunity 
structures while the movements that engage in 
challenges in low-profile policy areas tend to 
cooperate with governments and be 
strategically incorporated.58  
 
The three necessary elements of Tilly’s 
historical sociology approach on social 
movements, namely campaigns, repertoires, 
and displays of WUNC, have been integral to 
the Gezi Park movement’s formation and a 
catalyst to its development. Tilly, arguably, 
provides the most effective theoretical 
framework for comprehensively assessing the 
Gezi Park movement’s dynamics. The Gezi 
Park movement consisted of a plethora of 
social groups including human rights activists, 
labour unions, environmentalists, minorities 
such as the Kurds and Alawites, anti-
capitalists, liberal Muslims, students, 
entrepreneurs, academics, artists, nationalists, 
anarchists, immigrants, and the LGBT 
community, among several other groups 
among which some shared religious and 
political ideologies while others did not. 59 
Moreover, some groups shared membership 
with others.60 For instance, the group of the 
women, the largest group of the Gezi Park 
movement in size, was a very heterogeneous 
group since it consisted of students, mothers, 
feminists, and sex-workers. So, its 
composition became a subject of intense 
research.61 Another diverse group that had a 
profound role in the Gezi Park movement was 
the football fans, also known as Istanbul 
United, with an even more astonishing 
heterogeneous composition. This group united 
the fans of Istanbul’s three most widely 
supported football teams, namely Besiktas, 
Fenerbahce, and Galatasaray, who had been 
fanatically fighting each other prior to the Gezi 
Park protests.  
 
The Women’s Group 
Here I will examine the dynamics of the 
women’s group within the Gezi Park 
movement. Initially, the women’s motives will 
be explained by concisely describing their 
position within Turkey’s sociocultural 
landscape before the Gezi Park protests, 
paving the way for an analysis of the 
composition and role of the women’s group 
during the protests. 
Women in Turkey 
“Women and men are not equal” 62  is what 
Erdogan asserted. Through the rise of the AKP 
to power in 2002, a conservative Islamic 
agenda has been promoted in Turkey’s 
sociopolitical life which has greatly affected 
the Turkish women’s social status. In pursuit 
of this agenda which arguably degrades 
women’s social role, Erdogan has tried to 
abolish the ban on headscarves for women,63 
and has led the endorsement of Islamic social 
norms and the promotion of women’s maternal 
role, their expected submissive attitude 
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towards men, and the control of women’s 
bodies through campaigns for personal 
honour.64 Domestic violence against women, 
often pregnant women, is a prevalent 
phenomenon that typifies the degradation of 
women’s role in Turkey’s society. However, 
women largely tolerate such treatment without 
resisting because they are unaware of the laws 
and the available measures for their protection. 
At the same time, the government tends to not 
take action to prevent domestic violence. 65 
Evidence suggests that women are being 
domestically abused by men, regardless of the 
family’s socioeconomic status, especially in 
traditional families in which men have the 
dominant role and women are submissive.66 
Irrespective of the physical violence, women 
are often expected to tolerate almost every act 
of their husband, even extramarital affairs, 
polygyny is still practiced in some regions, and 
women are often not allowed to divorce since 
they also run the risk of being murdered for 
family honour.67 
Social and sexual oppression occurs in Turkey 
and thus impunity for violence against women 
in Turkey is not unusual. 68  Moreover, the 
control over women threatens women’s 
personal life in other ways too. Thus, equating 
abortion with murder in 2012,69 he based his 
declaration on religious rationale and 
attempted to pass laws for banning this 
practice altogether. 70  Overall, the role of 
women has been dramatically marginalised 
since the AKP’s rise to power in 2002 via the 
promotion of its conservative Islamic agenda 
which it strives to legally secure. This 
undermining of women is the underlying 
reason behind the rally of several female 
groups behind the women’s group in an 
attempt to vigorously oppose Erdogan’s 
oppressive measures. 
 
In accordance with the Gezi Park movement’s 
composition, the women’s group that 
participated in the Gezi Park movement was 
remarkably heterogeneous as well including 
numerous middle-aged women who had never 
participated in any form of political or social 
action.71 Up to this point, many young women 
had abstained from political life completely by 
not even voting, largely due to their mistrust of 
the political elite.72  Furthermore, mothers of 
juvenile protesters joined the movement after 
Erdogan’s threats towards their offspring. The 
feminists were the dominant group of the 
women’s group but the secular and the 
religious groups of women were also very 
influential.73 Kurdish women of all ages joined 
the movement along with Turkish women from 
the working and the middle classes, including 
sex-workers.74 Generally, the women’s group 
was the largest group within the Gezi Park 
movement and thus it practically encompassed 
women of all ages, classes, ideologies who 
altogether formed one of the most dynamic 
groups of the Gezi Park movement, actually 
representing the entire country’s female 
population. The dynamics of the women’s 
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groups will be analysed through the following: 
campaigns, repertoires, displays of WUNC. 
Campaigns 
Tilly refers to campaigns as protracted claims 
directed against the authorities. The claims of 
the women’s group were clearly defined and 
opposed to the brutality, violence, and 
harassment unleashed against them. 75  The 
group held the AKP responsible not only for 
tolerating these malignities through impunity 
but for instigating them through its rhetoric. 
The protesting women were chanting 
fervently: “A life without Tayyip, a life 
without harassment”, 76  “Run Tayyip run, 
women are coming”, “Women walking, 
struggle continuing”.77 The women demanded 
their right for control over their bodies, a 
subject that Erdogan’s government demanded 
too.78 The Gezi Park movement appeared to be 
the only means for them to claim their 
autonomy and decide for themselves whether 
they will raise three children, as Erdogan urged 
them to, have an abortion, or be childless 
without being stigmatised as deficient, as 
Erdogan called them. 79  The persistent 
campaign under the slogan “My body, My 
decision” which aimed to oppose the banning 
of abortions evolved for the purposes of the 
Gezi Park movement into “My park, My 
decision” and “My country, My decision”.80 
Posters and banners were also widely deployed 
among protesters with slogans directed 
towards the same claims which wrote “Prime 
minister, get your hands off my body, AKP get 
your hands off my body, abortion is a right, 
Uludere a massacre”. 81  A dominant 
characteristic of their grievances was also the 
social empowerment of women: they opposed 
the traditional family structure promoted by 
the government which urged women to stay 
home in order to take care of the household, 
give birth to children and raise them. Eslen-
Ziva and Erhart compiled several of the 
women’s slogans that characteristically 
represented their claims through the following 
assertive posters: “Let’s not stay boxed in at 
home, let’s go out to the parks and streets. […] 
Our place is at work, not the kitchen […] 
Forget your housework and let the world stop 
spinning!”. 82  Furthermore, the following 
assertive slogans were also chanted by women 
during the protests: “We are getting out of the 
home, come from your house, from the private 
sphere. […] Taksim is Ours, Gezi is Ours, 
Istanbul is Ours”. 83  One of their arguments 
opposed their exclusion from several mosques 
on Fridays and it was expressed through the 
following poster: “We want the mosques, 
streets at night, and squares”.84 The women’s 
claims were clear and confronted Erdogan’s 
plans for dictating their personal life and 
depriving them of public life. Their claims 
aspired for autonomy in their personal life, 
autonomy in their academic and professional 
career, and autonomy in their social life by 
having fun through smoking and drinking 
alcohol and, generally, customise their 
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amusement according to their personal tastes. 
These demands seem consistent with reports of 
loss of personal freedom. According to 
Freedom House’s official report, for example, 
personal autonomy in Turkey had drastically 
declined along with other individual, 
associational, and organisational rights. 85  In 
response to Erdogan’s urge for at least three 
children, the protesting women were wearing 
t-shirts on which was printed “At least three 
books, at least three beers, at least three cats, at 
least three songs”.86 Evidently, the women’s 
group protested against Erdogan’s government 
for numerous protracted claims which opposed 
the governmental policies against women’s 
rights. 
Repertoires  
Tilly’s theoretical framework treats repertoires 
as modern collective actions and rituals.87 The 
women’s group was particularly creative in 
this respect and managed to become a 
distinctive symbol of the Gezi Park movement. 
Remarkably, a woman, known as ‘the woman 
in red’, became the emblematic figure against 
women’s oppression and served as the means 
to attract female protesters in the movement 
and gain global support through the digital 
media.88 The woman in red is a young lady 
who was photographed wearing a red dress, 
holding a white bag, and standing next to the 
police deployment unwary of the police officer 
who was spraying tear-gas in her face (see 
Appendix A).89 
Furthermore, the women’s group adopted 
Erdem Gündüz’s form of protesting known as 
‘the standing man effect’. The protesters stood 
still for hours and thus discomforting the 
police in not knowing how to treat them since 
they did not constitute a direct threat nor did 
they perform any illegal acts. Yonca adopted 
this form of remonstration by standing still for 
30 hours at the place in Ankara where the 
police shot the 26 year old protester Ethem 
Sarisolok in the head. Photos quickly 
circulated with Yonca and the victim’s wife 
and brother at her side (see Appendix B).90 Her 
action was the means for conveying her 
grievances to Erdogan she explained by 
declaring the following:  
By standing, I felt that I was finally 
able to pay my respects to Ethem and 
his family. I felt that I could mourn 
and express my sorrow for all the 
people who were hurt, injured and 
dead during the three weeks of 
resistance. The government ordered 
us to ‘go home’. I was not going 
home, but standing here, continuing 
to resist. I felt like shouting out loud, 
‘No sir, I am not going back home!’ 
and here I am ‘standing’.91 
Additionally, another repertoire was 
developed through the media and encouraged 
several women to join the Gezi Park 
movement. However, this repertoire was not 
performed by the protesters but by the 
government itself. The governor of Istanbul, 
Mutlu, called the mothers of the juvenile 
protesters to protect their children by bringing 
them back home. Nevertheless, Mutlu’s call 
backfired as mothers joined the Gezi Park 
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movement and formed a chain of bodies along 
with their children so that they may protect not 
only their offspring but their future too (see 
Appendix C).92 
Moreover, other than protesting, the women 
created other events including forums and 
workshops in order to effectively deal with 
women’s more specialized concerns. 93  A 
characteristic example of such events 
addressed the women’s struggle for 
eliminating sexist language throughout the 
movement, especially language that is often 
ascribed to sex-workers and homosexuals. 
Some protesters called the politicians, and 
especially Erdogan, ‘sons of whores’. Such 
slogans were highly offensive to the sex-
workers because they portrayed them as 
unethical and so the women’s group took 
action to eliminate such slogans. One sex-
worker, namely Ecem Dalkiran, protested with 
a poster that asserted that “We whores are 
certain that these politicians are not our 
sons”.94 Subsequently, women took the matter 
of sexist language seriously and initiated 
interactive seminars in order to educate the 
protesters on the harmful implications of sexist 
language not only for the women but for the 
entire movement’s cohesion and the society as 
a whole. Notably, the Carsi, a group of football 
fans that used sexist language often in football 
stadiums, acknowledged their mistake and 
apologised to the sex-workers by offering 
flowers and stating “[w]e are used to this sort 
of language, but didn’t misunderstand, we love 
you”.95 
 
Displays of Worthiness, Unity, 
Numbers, and Commitment 
(WUNC) 
 
Worthiness 
According to the Tilly, worthiness refers to the 
protesters’ solemnity and the involvement of 
women, children, and important people in the 
mission.96  The aforementioned action of the 
mothers who protected their children against 
Mutlu’s exhortation is definitely an act of 
worthiness because it attracted women without 
previous political action, often without even 
solid political ideology, who have been 
consistent with the governmentally promoted 
maternal role not in service of the government 
or their husbands but in service of their 
children.97 
Moreover, not all mothers joined the Gezi Park 
movement after Mutlu’s exhortation. Most 
mothers were holding their children while 
protesting since the very first days of the Gezi 
Park movement. Their action was a stark sign 
of the mothers’ resistance towards Erdogan’s 
concept of motherhood and independence 
from their husbands. They embraced a vibrant 
notion of motherhood; mothers who could join 
a social movement and claim their personal 
and their children’s rights. That notion of 
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motherhood was absent from Erdogan’s 
conservative Islamic agenda.98 Also, the lady 
in the red elegant dress indicates that the 
appearance of the protesters was dignified, it 
was not the appearance of a capulcu, a looter 
or drunk as Erdogan strived to portray them.99 
 
Unity  
Unity pertains to a group’s solidarity.100 The 
heterogeneous composition of the women’s 
group might have drastically hindered its 
unity. Nevertheless, women of distinct social, 
cultural, political, and religious backgrounds 
joined the women’s group and acted unitarily 
by incorporating within their campaigns and 
repertoires the claims of the various women’s 
subgroups. These claims were mutually 
adopted and supported by the various 
subgroups. An indicative example of 
expression of the women’s solidarity was the 
aforementioned instance when the sex-
workers’ dignity was protected by the women, 
especially the feminists, through interactive 
campaigns against sexism. Moreover, the 
feminists joined the mothers’ initiative to 
actively protect their children by protesting 
instead of passively bringing them home.101 
Interestingly, the women who favoured the ban 
on headscarves in public institutions were also 
supported by hijab-wearing women (see 
Appendix D). 102  Comparatively, the women 
without headscarves supported the hijab-
wearing women by incorporating their right for 
self-definition of their identity through the 
following slogans: “Get your hands off my 
body, headscarf and identity. […] Don’t attack 
my headscarf”. 103  Overall, every protesting 
woman supported the other women’s claims 
through slogans, posters, and banners and, 
especially, the claims for the empowerment 
and autonomy of women. Women equally 
opposed both the attempted lift of the 
headscarf ban and the social stigma against 
hijab-wearing women. Specifically, a feminist 
activist by the name of Nilgun Yurdalan who 
disagreed with women wearing headscarves 
stated that “[a] woman being harassed or 
attacked because of her headscarf is a very 
serious matter. In a situation like this, it is 
necessary to catch the attacker immediately. It 
was very important that the march was joined 
by women from different areas of society, 
whether they be secular, feminist, or 
socialist”.104 
The participation of culturally diverse women 
within the same social movement also made 
them realise their unrealistically biased 
perception of each other. Through their 
interaction women developed a mutual 
understanding of their sociopolitical position 
and consolidated their claims under one 
agenda which embraced holistically the 
women’s social concerns. This interaction is 
accurately explained by Birgul, another 
feminist, as follows: 
We, as feminists, pitched our tents in 
the Gezi Park. [...] During this 
process, women in the Park whom we 
regard as ‘apolitical’ expressed their 
critiques about restrictive discourses 
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of the left to feminists. We would 
have called those women as 
‘disorganized’, but they had a 
completely different way of 
organizing that we were not able to 
conceive. As feminists, we 
questioned ourselves, and then, 
personally I clearly understood that it 
is not possible anymore to move 
forward by using the outdated 
ways.105 
Undeniably, the Gezi Park movement evolved 
the women’s perception of their identity and 
the perception of the women’s identity in total. 
Women joined the Gezi Park movement driven 
by their personal experiences, and ideologies 
but through it they became rich in perceptions 
by realising other ‘truths’ through different 
perspectives. Ultimately, the women 
recognised that they had more reasons to unite 
than to be divided and through their various 
activities they endorsed a stable rhetoric which 
they endeavoured to diffuse throughout the 
Gezi Park movement. A leftist woman, known 
as Selen, described the unitary action by 
expressing that “[f]or the first time a Kurd, a 
nationalist, a Muslim and I are all together. 
You think you know the reality very well and 
then suddenly ... boom! Gezi Park was one of 
the greatest thrills of my life. It’s not 
something I can explain with all my previous 
world experience”.106 Another leftist woman, 
Aysegul, expressed the women’s unity within 
the Gezi Park movement more emphatically: 
I cannot describe what Gezi 
represented to me. For the first time I 
was no longer alone, no longer a 
minority! The left is a very small 
group and when we protest we are 
always alone in the streets. Gezi made 
real the collective protest I dreamed 
since I was a child. It gave me a lot of 
hope, because we were strong like in 
my parent’s past. I thought that we 
could do something for the future. 
And even in a funny way. What 
happened has its roots in the 1980 
coup and people finally understood 
what kind of society we live in. We 
[young socialists] always thought our 
generation was a lost generation 
because it was apolitical, but now we 
know that is not so.107 
Clearly, the display of unity of the women’s 
group was in its most remarkable and 
unexpected display of WUNC which was not 
restricted to the Gezi Park movement, but it 
transformed their perception of the other 
women’s subgroups.  
 
Numbers 
Numbers refers to the movement’s size. 108 
More women participated in the Gezi Park 
movement than men. 109  However, it is not 
possible to determine their exact number since 
some women protested through the women’s 
group while others joined other groups of the 
movement. It would be inaccurate to include 
the latter in the women’s group data since they 
did not directly protest for the women’s claims. 
Nonetheless, the size of the women’s group 
was a determining factor of the group’s 
dynamics which were also reinforced by the 
women who, even though they did not protest 
for their own reasons, felt pride and empathy 
for them. As an illustration, numerous women 
who did not protest supported the protesting 
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women by standing at their balconies and 
windows banging their pots in order to express 
their support for the women group’s resistance 
to Erdogan’s government. 110  Moreover, 
another group of women who did not protest 
supported the movement too; they were female 
doctors and nurses who rushed to the 
protesters’ aid after they had clashed with the 
police in order to treat the injured protesters.111 
In a nutshell, even though it is not possible to 
know how many women participated in the 
Gezi Park movement, the protesting women 
comprised the majority of the women and they 
were cherished by most other women who 
encouraged and supported them through their 
own means.  
 
Commitment  
Commitment denotes the protesters’ selfless 
contribution.112 The members of the women’s 
group were so committed in their mission that 
they did not abandon the Gezi Park movement 
even if they were harassed and abused. In the 
police’s unsuccessful attempt to suppress the 
women’s group, they even resorted to sexual 
harassment in order to scare women. 113 
However, even though the police officers 
assumed they would not be exposed by the 
women, especially the more religious, in order 
to protect their social prestige, the women 
reported their actions to civil society 
institutions which brought their claims to the 
court. 114  After the first report on 30th June, 
several other women followed who not only 
ignored the consequences of legal action on 
their social lives but reported even more police 
brutalities that eventually caused even more 
women to join the Gezi Park protests. Other 
than the female protesters, even female doctors 
who were treating the beaten protesters were 
sexually assaulted by the police.115  
Also, the commitment of the veiled women 
was confoundedly resilient. These women not 
only confronted the police’s violence in unity 
with other women but they also confronted the 
hostile treatment by some protesters who 
opposed headscarves. However, instead of 
opposing, or at least abandoning, the Gezi Park 
movement they exhibited strength of character 
and remained devoted to their struggle against 
the government, ignoring their adversaries.116 
Arguably, these women were twice as 
courageous and committed to their cause. The 
women’s commitment to the Gezi Park 
movement, despite the violence and sexual 
harassment, created numerous everyday 
heroes as it has been previously shown. These 
heroes enhanced the women’s group’s 
commitment by encouraging them to imitate 
them by becoming ‘fearless’ even after the 
police escalated the violence. Nur, a 29-year 
old woman articulated the common sentiments 
in the following words: 
Right now, on the 16th day of the 
occupation, I feel that the violence 
from the police is getting more 
aggressive. [...] Whenever we thought 
that the police was not able to attack 
because so many people were around, 
we saw that the police was violent and 
that it did not matter that so many 
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people were resisting. [...] Now I feel 
no fear because so many people are 
here. No fear.117 
The emerging heroes of the women’s group 
fostered a robust sense of altruism within the 
group which empowered women to pursue 
their rights by overcoming the traditional 
norms, violence, and fears. The women’s 
group stayed intact and united regardless of the 
hardships which were mainly imposed by the 
police. 
Assessment 
Overall, the analysis of the women group’s 
dynamics evinces that it fulfils Tilly’s 
requirements of social movements. 
Undeniably, the many protesting women were 
fervent and conscious about their 
aforementioned protracted claims. The 
remaining women who were not so resolute 
formed their perceptions throughout the Gezi 
Park movement. The dynamics that emerged 
within the women’s group were specific and 
targeted Erdogan’s government which had 
hastened to oppress their lives, bodies, and 
minds. In pursuit of its conservative Islamic 
agenda, the AKP deliberately undermined the 
women’s social role by confining it to 
household and reproduction so that they may 
serve Erdogan’s demographic plans. The 
government would have never imagined that 
the oppression of women would mobilise, not 
only the feminists who have traditionally been 
Erdogan’s opponents, but the traditional 
women who wanted to maintain their role of 
the housewife and be predominantly mothers. 
Of course, the mothers’ decision was mainly 
encouraged by the government’s threat 
directed towards their children. Overall, the 
most important consequence of the women’s 
group’s participation in the Gezi Park 
movement, however, is the fact that its 
dynamics had an astonishing transformative 
effect not only on themselves but on the 
Turkish contentious politics in general. 
Throughout the Gezi Park protests, the 
women’s group played a catalytic role not only 
through demonstrating but, predominantly, 
because they evolved their social role to be 
equal to the men’s and they had both men and 
women realise it. While claiming their rights 
and social dignity, they also educated men and 
women and managed to effectively eliminate 
sexist discourse from social movements thus 
contributing to their worthiness and exhibiting 
unity regardless of who practiced it. They 
fostered a conciliatory character for the 
movement, educated protesters on proper 
social practices and created forums for 
interactively exchanging views among the 
Gezi Park movement’s groups. Education is a 
transformational process whose effect exceeds 
social movements and in this regard the 
women’s group had a far-reaching 
transformative effect on the protesters and the 
Turkish society. Certainly though the women’s 
group strengthened Turkish women’s social 
position, refined contentious politics in Turkey 
and, predominantly, it fostered civilisation by 
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encouraging cross-cultural cooperation via 
interactive exchange of information which 
aimed to arrive to sociopolitical claims through 
a synthesis of various perspectives. 
 
Istanbul United 
In this section I will analyse the dynamics of 
the football fans’ group that participated in the 
Gezi Park movement according to Tilly’s 
historical sociology theory in order to assess 
the movement’s transformative dynamics for 
Turkey’s contentious politics. Firstly, the 
football fans’ motives will be delineated by 
describing their position within Turkey’s 
sociocultural landscape before the Gezi 
protests and, successively, the synthesis of the 
football fans’ group will be explored. The 
group’s actions within the Gezi Park 
movement will then be analysed in keeping 
with the aforementioned theoretical 
framework’s elements; and finally the cultural 
evolution of the football fans’ social role will 
be assessed. 
Football fans in Turkey 
Football is definitely the most popular sport in 
Turkey. The three most popular football teams 
in Turkey are Besiktas, Fenerbahce and 
Galatasaray and their fans are essentially 
men. 118  Markedly, Turkish football’s 
popularity is so impactful that it has 
occasionally been instrumentalised by political 
elites as diplomatic capital. Thus, in the past 
the Turkish government arranged a football 
match between Fenerbache and al-Ittihad 
Aleppo in order to improve its relations with 
its neighbouring country Syria.119  Moreover, 
Turkish governments have often used football 
fans in the past to propagate nationalist 
messages.120 The most dominant characteristic 
of the fans’ attitude is the excessive use of 
violence amongst the fans which is not limited 
to football groups but tends to extend beyond 
the stadia and to the streets of Turkish cities.121 
The fanaticism is so intense that they often 
resort to severe violence.122 The three teams, 
namely Besiktas, Fenerbahce, and 
Galatasaray, have the largest fan bases and 
their fans are the most fanatical amongst 
Turkish clubs.123 Their frequent conflicts often 
lead to clashes with the police who are 
constantly trying to contain the violence. 124 
The fans of Besiktas are called Carsi and they 
consist of radical men who do not miss the 
opportunity to promote a particular political 
ideology. Carsi have an anarchist and leftist 
orientation and they fervently oppose fascism, 
racism, pornography, and child abuse among 
other similar causes. They often promote these 
causes through posters and slogans during 
football matches. 125  The organised fans of 
Fenerbahce call themselves the Association of 
Fenerbahce and include subgroups like the 
‘Kill For You’ and Galatasaray’s fans are 
known as Ultraslan. 126  The football fans’ 
group was a predominant group of the Gezi 
Park movement that has not been extensively 
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researched compared to the women’s group.127 
The fans’ group consisted of the fans of 
Besiktas, Fenerbahce and Galatasaray, who 
altogether united under a common group of 
football fans, namely ‘Istanbul United’.128 The 
leaders of Istanbul United were the Besiktas’ 
fans, the Carsi.129 
Campaigns 
The football fans’ protests addressed their 
opposition to Erdogan’s authoritarian 
practices. Prior to the Gezi Park movement and 
regardless of football concerns, the young fans 
were discontent with the government, as most 
youngsters were, because they felt that their 
secular lifestyles and practices were being 
restricted. 130  Furthermore, Erdogan’s 
intervention in football affairs was not 
welcomed by the fans. In January 2011, 
Erdogan’s representatives called Galatasaray’s 
president incompetent and, eventually, forced 
him to resign irrespective of the club’s or its 
fans’ views. Further, in May 2011, the 
government pushed policies for the outright 
repression of what they called ‘hooligan 
behaviour’ due to Carsi’s recurrent clashes 
with the police. 131  The football fans’ 
oppression was the predominant reason for 
their participation in the Gezi Park movement 
but not the only one. According to Irak, an 
expert in studying football fans in Turkey, the 
reasons that led to the institution of Istanbul 
United encompassed “political hegemony, 
police violence, the democratic deficit and 
distrust of the media”. 132  Evidently, the 
democratic deficit of Erdogan’s political 
hegemony was perceived as a catalytic threat 
to their freedom. A culture of impunity was 
fostered within the police force which, in turn, 
served as the government’s praetorian 
guard. 133  “Naturally we are going to rebel 
against all unfairness we see. Where there is no 
justice, democratic reaction is legitimate, and 
you need to suck it up, my friend”, uttered 
Cene, the founder of Carci. His use of football 
slang indicates that his reaction to the 
government is not simply an anarchist or 
political initiative but a commonsensical 
reaction to Erdogan’s unfair interventions. The 
concern for government’s oppression of 
democratic processes was also expressed by 
İlker Yaldız, another Carci, who asserted that 
the Gezi Park’s pedestrianisation was merely 
one dissent among several others which were 
more substantive and were represented by the 
Gezi Park movement. Specifically, he claimed 
that 
[t]he issue is not anymore about the 
shopping mall or about the trees. If 
this much violence is the response to 
the most rightful and peaceful 
demonstration on earth, tomorrow 
what will their response be to a protest 
against a politician, to a workers 
strike, or to a football fan issue! 
Removal of the right to 
demonstrate/to protest is a question of 
democracy and regime.134 
Interestingly, their passionate ideological 
orientation did not segregate this emerging 
movement but united it. Obviously, Carci’s 
ideological orientation was diametrically 
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opposed to Erdogan’s government. Carci’s 
priority became Istanbul United’s unity. The 
Carci’s struggle for unity is also expressed 
through another Carci’s, Ayhan Aytac, ardent 
motivation speech who said “Friends, this 
struggle is beyond political divides. It is a 
struggle about being human”. 135  The fans 
considered the government’s segregative 
attempts insidious and its violent oppression 
unreasonable, fascist, and, most notably, 
inhuman. Another Carci, Doruk Kaymak, 
described the Gezi Park protests’ situation by 
saying: “Really bad things are happening; the 
police brutally attack people with tear gas. 
While one group tried to escape, the wall 
crashed down over them; there are wounded 
people. What kind of government is that! How 
people can vote for these guys! I’ve never seen 
fascism of this kind”.136 Overall, the football 
fans protested against their prolonged 
oppression and police brutality. 
Repertoires  
Initially, when the football fans of the three 
teams joined the Gezi Park movement, they 
united under one group, namely ‘Istanbul 
United’ (See Appendix E). They also 
combined their teams’ three logos to create a 
single Istanbul United logo.137 The Gezi Park 
movement took place a few weeks after two 
fans of Galatasaray had killed a 20-year old fan 
of Fenerbahce; he was only one of many 
victims of the teams’ bloody street-fights. 
Nonetheless, the fans joined forces 
successfully through the Gezi Park movement 
in order to oppose government policies. 138 
Humour was characteristic of Istanbul 
United’s repertoire which was also promoted 
effectively through the media. Traditionally, 
the football fans had developed a vigorous 
presence in the social media because they were 
excluded from the mass media. Their effective 
use of humour indicated their distinctive 
fearlessness which attracted several 
revolutionaries to the Gezi Park movement 
through slogans like “Tear gas, oley!”, which 
was shouted during their clashes with the 
police in order to encourage the protesters to 
withstand police pressure. 139  Moreover, the 
humour and the slang language was a means 
for strengthening the fans’ intimacy with the 
other citizens so that they may identify with 
them and support their cause. Their slogans, 
like the following, referred to several social 
concerns through their own experiences: 
“Hološko + Bir miktar para verelim 
HÜKÜMETİ VERİN!’, meaning that we will 
give you the football star Holosko and some 
money and you will give us back the 
government!”. 140  Additionally, Istanbul 
United played a crucial role within the Gezi 
Park movement because it was the only group 
experienced in fighting the police (See 
Appendix F). 141  Their uncompromising 
resistance became symbol of the movement 
which ritualistically cheered for them during 
the clashes. Their support climaxed when the 
Carci captured a bulldozer and used it to 
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destroy the police’s armoured water cannons 
(See Appendix G). Their action boosted the 
entire movement’s morale and the protesters 
were confident that through the football fans 
they could even win the battle against the 
police force. Furthermore, the fans could 
withstand and reciprocate brutality against the 
police without breaking formation. They 
encouraged other protesters not to retreat. A 
leading Carci who had realised the importance 
of Istanbul United for the Gezi Park 
movement’s survival said: 
Let me tell you this, this is our 
training; we are trained 
(antrenmanlıyız) for this. Ordinary 
people do not know what to do at the 
moment of clash with the police. 
Thanks to game days, and the events 
of May the first, we are trained. 
During the Gezi protests, no fan of 
Çarşı carried cleavers or big gyro 
knives. We know how far the police 
can go and we know the maximum 
effective range of tear gas; therefore 
we know better than ordinary people 
how to protect ourselves from tear 
gas. This is what Çarşı has done; 
without going too far, staying back.142 
Evidently, the football fans were very 
conscious of their strong role within the Gezi 
Park movement and they were determined to 
perform their duty wholeheartedly because it 
was not only their interests they represented 
but the interests of the entire Turkish society. 
However, they were very realistic, disciplined, 
and modest in their actions at the same time. 
They did not consider themselves heroes but 
they were aware that they served as vanguards 
and role-models for the entire movement. 
Their attitude is brilliantly explained through 
another Carci’s words: 
[m]ost of the people who came there 
were novices, in regard to tear gas and 
struggle against the police. Çarşı is 
now very experienced with these. 
That day, while walking from 
Harbiye towards the police group, we 
were being repeatedly tear gassed. Of 
course, we were ready for this, with 
our head gears, and scarves. We 
covered our mouths and put lemon 
drops into our eyes. Those guys there 
(the novices) were backing off when 
the tear gas arrived. This was not 
good. Because we needed to move 
forward against the police violence, 
even when we were tear gassed, in 
order to push them back. We actually 
achieved this, and this is the reason 
we were successful that day. We were 
motivating those guys. If Çarşı is a 
legend today, it all started that day.143  
Indeed, Istanbul United became a legend 
within Turkish contentious politics and even a 
documentary was filmed to provide insights 
and praise their action. The characteristics that 
made them so appealing were not only their 
competence in battling the police, but the 
combination of their tutelary spirit which 
defended not only themselves and the groups 
that agreed with them but other groups that 
prior to the Gezi Park protests considered them 
lowlifes; the fans abandoned their obstinate, 
often even racist, perception about the LGBT 
group and the women through reconciliation 
and their cultivation of conciliatory character. 
Remarkably, they abstained substantially from 
sexist language which was an integral part of 
their daily speech. The women contributed to 
this cause drastically through their interactive 
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workshops which successfully minimised the 
fans’ homophobic language that would insult 
other groups and even encouraged them to 
apologise.144 They even apologised when they 
insulted others through their talks without 
having offensive intentions. The fans’ attitude 
obviously prioritised cooperation through the 
institution of shared norms over unilateral 
initiatives through inconsiderate behaviour. 
Their cooperativeness inspired all groups of 
the Gezi Park movement to work together 
since the fans were the most intransigent 
group. Additionally, the football fans also 
exhibited moral character by protecting the 
anti-capitalist Muslims. The Gezi Park 
movement opposed earnestly religious politics 
since this was seen as being Erdogan’s 
instrument. Therefore, religious practices 
could generate unnecessary conflict over trivia 
within the Gezi Park movement. Therefore, 
Istanbul United along with the LGBT group 
safeguarded public prayers. 145  Surprisingly, 
the standardisation of acceptable norms for 
mutual respect within the Gezi Park movement 
was not merely followed by the fans but it was 
wholeheartedly embraced and sometimes even 
led by them. Markedly, not only the fans 
protect the other groups’ right for praying 
publically but these tough guys who praised 
masculinity cooperated closely with the LGBT 
group which has a totally different stance on 
this issue. A traditional society, according to 
Erdogan’s conservative standards, would not 
have allowed for such cooperation. However, 
these ideological misconceptions had vanished 
and this was definitely not a development that 
the government could have predicted.  
The cooperation between Istanbul United and 
other groups continued, especially in 
standardising the mutually acceptable moral 
conduct within the Gezi Park movement. This 
collectivity remained dynamic even during the 
clashes with the police. Remarkably, when 
Istanbul United lost formation in the front line 
momentarily while battling with the police, the 
fans asked the LGBT group to line up in front 
of them so that they may regroup into 
formation. Their plan was performed 
effectively. Minutes later, when some fans 
were badly injured, one of them shouted “the 
boy in the skirt has a first-aid kit”. He did so 
not to humiliate him but to indicate, in his own 
words of course, that that boy was in the front 
line to assist them. Mutual respect was 
cultivated deeply in the Gezi Park movement’s 
protesters and that was evident even at the 
most intense moments of the protests. The 
football fans considered their former target for 
sarcasm, namely the LGBT group, as equally 
brave and the LGBT members felt it and 
reciprocated their sincere respect towards 
Istanbul United.146 The football fans, despite 
their absence of formal leadership, became the 
inspirational leaders of the Gezi Park 
movement who encouraged and organised the 
other protesting groups. Their leading role 
during the demonstrations is also evinced by 
the following words of Ali who worked as 
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engineer at a university: “They were coming 
like a band (bando), and filling people with 
energy and confidence. We all became 
Beşiktaş fans. Then, we thought it’s more 
important to convert our own teams into 
something similar to Beşiktaş”.147 The football 
fans in a way structured the Gezi Park 
movement’s modus operandi not only for 
protesting but for ensuring the harmonious 
cooperation of its various groups. Moreover, 
the other protesters became more competent 
through encouragement and training. The other 
groups learned from Istanbul United’s 
organisation and developed their own group in 
line with it by incorporating their own 
characteristics. Additionally, the football fans 
distributed kandil cookies to the protesters as 
religious gifts in order to express their 
gratitude to the imam of the Dolmabahçe 
mosque. This imam had let the doctors to 
temporarily convert the mosque into an 
improvised hospital where medical personnel 
could treat the wounded. The football fans’ 
tactic was very clever because it countered 
Erdogan’s call to the conservative Muslims to 
reprobate the Gezi Park movement. Through 
the offering of sweets the football fans 
successfully branded the imam’s altruistic 
decision as pro-Gezi, securing several 
Muslims’ endorsement of their cause.148 The 
football fans’ tactics throughout the Gezi Park 
movement were extremely effective in 
unifying, safeguarding, inspiring, and 
organising the Gezi Park movement. Arguably 
though, educating the fans who were the 
movement’s opinion leaders by establishing 
the acceptable conduct of communication was 
the most challenging and effective success of 
the football fans’ repertoire. 
 
Displays of worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment (WUNC) 
 
Worthiness 
The football fans were used as scapegoat by 
the government to undermine the Gezi Park 
movement’s legitimacy because they were 
depicted as brainless hooligans whose highest 
ambition in life would be their team winning a 
trophy. 149  Moreover, there were no women, 
children or significantly important individuals 
within the group. However, Istanbul United 
vanguarded the various groups that comprised 
women and children. Furthermore, it attracted 
moderately important people like the president 
of Fenerbahce, Aziz Yildirim, who is a 
respectable public figure. Yildirim not only did 
not condemn the pro-Gezi slogans of 
Fenerahce’s fans during matches but, 
interestingly, he joined them in protesting 
against the government. Moreover, following 
the end of the Gezi Park protests, a rally was 
organised by the lawyers of Ali Ismail 
Korkmaz, a 19-year old student who was killed 
during the protests, in his memory. 300,000 
fans of Istanbul United joined the rally, 
including Fenerbahce’s president Yildirim. 
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During the match that followed the rally, the 
fans united again and chanted rhythmically 
“Her Yer Futbol, Her Yer Direnis”150: ‘football 
is everywhere, resistance is everywhere’. 
Indeed, football was equated with resistance to 
the government. The protesters’ position 
within the Turkish society had forever been 
changed and their ideological positions 
matured. Since the Gezi Park protests, the 
football fans are considered socially conscious 
citizens who are worthy of respect and they 
still participate in social causes. They are the 
evidence that the Gezi Park movement’s 
dynamics remain potent. 
 
Unity 
Through the Gezi Park movement, the football 
fans’ solidarity has been utterly revolutionised. 
The strong bonds within each team have 
traditionally been unparalleled; however the 
expansion of these bonds to incorporate the 
entire Turkish society was unprecedented. The 
individuals who prior to the Gezi protests were 
sworn enemies of each other united for the 
Gezi Park movement under Istanbul United 
and formed the frontline of the pitched battles 
against the police. They were wearing t-shirts 
with Istanbul United’s logo and allied 
themselves with groups, like the LGBT group, 
whose perceptions were completely different 
and who had been viewed as outsiders in the 
past.151 The fans acknowledged their enemies 
and allies and acted accordingly in each 
situation. The fans of Istanbul United dressed 
similarly, they were marching in synchronised 
stride, and used symbolic language in their 
slogans and posters so that their uniformity 
united them under a unified social movement, 
one solid group, a true family. While the size 
of Istanbul United’s fans base is not reported, 
undoubtedly Besiktas, Fenerbahce, and 
Galatasaray are the three most popular football 
teams in Turkey. Therefore, the vast majority 
of the Turkish football fans would fall under 
Istanbul United. 
 
Commitment  
Commitment was definitely the most 
characteristic element of Istanbul United. As 
described above, the football fans never 
hesitated to confront the police, especially 
when they had to protect the other groups. 
Their altruistic attitude rendered them role-
models of the Gezi Park movement. Their 
selflessness was not curbed even after several 
arrests of their members. They seemed 
conscious of the fact that the government was 
determined to neutralise them through any 
means necessary in order to break the Gezi 
Park movement. Intimidation, such as the 
incarceration of two fans on criminal and 
terrorist charges, did not erode the morale of 
Istanbul United group.152 Overall, the football 
fans were completely devoted to safeguarding 
the Gezi Park movement. Their commitment 
was tested extensively through police brutality, 
threats, social stigmatisation, accusation for 
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criminality, but they survived and became the 
movement’s legend. 
Assessment 
The football fans’ group was probably the 
most intriguing group within the Gezi Park 
protests movement. It had protracted claims 
against oppression, police brutality, political 
intervention in football affairs, and Erdogan’s 
authoritarianism which they held responsible 
for the country’s democratic deficit. It trained, 
safeguarded and boosted the morale of the 
Gezi Park movement through both victorious 
battles against the police and humour, and it 
was characterised by wide cooperation, smart 
tactics, vigorousness, and mutual respect. 
Moreover, it reconciled with formerly 
opposing groups. Additionally, they were 
exemplars of unity not only among themselves 
but within the entire movement. The 
predominant feature of Istanbul United’s 
dynamics though was its transformative effect 
on the football fans and the wider Turkish 
society. The commonly shared perception 
about the football fans’ reputation changed 
drastically. The underlying reason for this 
change was that the fans themselves had 
transformed their club loyalty into social 
solidarity. Before the Gezi Park protests, 
football fans had been perceived as uneducated 
troublemakers who were mindless and only 
interested in football and violence. Arguably, 
this assumption was not completely erroneous 
since the fans had not proved to be much more 
useful than this until then. However, Istanbul 
United enabled them to question these 
assumptions and empowered them to 
transform themselves by developing the entire 
movement’s dynamics in pursuit of democratic 
objectives. On the whole, they acknowledged 
any mistakes they did and apologised for them. 
They showed respect and earned it by 
protecting other groups and simultaneously 
encouraging them and motivating them. Their 
transformation remains substantially impactful 
on Turkish contentious politics. The fans 
participation in social causes and political 
discourse has become part of their life both 
verbally and through action.  
 
Epilogue 
The Gezi Park movement verified Tilly’s 
theory that social movements are not just 
historical subjects but they evolve by adapting 
to the societies’ dynamics. New social 
movements are heterogeneous in composition 
and represent a broader spectrum of 
perspectives and thus they lean towards the 
formation of increasingly dynamic societies. 
Interestingly, social movements not only 
reflect societies but they constantly determine 
social dynamics, including social roles and 
social reality. Therefore, societies determine 
their dynamics through social movements’ 
dynamism. This study employed Tilly’s 
historical sociology theoretical framework to 
assess the Gezi Park movement’s dynamics in 
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an attempt to examine how these dynamics 
transformed contentious politics in Turkey. 
Particularly, the three elements of Tilly’s 
theory, namely campaigns, repertoires, and 
displays of WUNC were applied to two 
representative groups of the Gezi Park 
movement, namely the women’s group and 
Istanbul United. These were arguably the key 
actors within the Gezi Park movement and 
they had been dramatically oppressed by 
Erdogan’s government for years. These two 
groups successfully qualified as social 
movements according to Tilly’s theory, despite 
their starkly dissimilar ideologies. 
Consequently, their character is determined by 
their dynamics and not by their ideological 
position. The women’s group comprised 
ideologically diverse women who united under 
one group and formed the largest group within 
the Gezi Park movement. During the protests 
they were exemplars of unity through various 
activities including interactive seminars, the 
standing man effect, the chain of bodies, and 
the medical support through the nurses. 
Through the Gezi Park movement, they 
managed to evolve their social role to be equal 
to men’s, educate others and promote cross-
cultural cooperation. 
The Istanbul United group consisted of the 
alliance among the fans of the three most 
popular football teams who were traditionally 
sworn enemies. It protested against the fans’ 
prolonged oppression through police brutality, 
intervention in football affairs and other 
authoritarian practices. Within the Gezi Park 
movement, the fans created Istanbul United’s 
logo, they made effective use of humour, the 
social media and other tactics, they trained 
other groups in combating the police, and 
boosted their morale by exhibiting 
selflessness, fearless attitude, and charismatic 
leadership. Their actions became legend for 
Turkish contentious politics and even a 
documentary, titled ‘Istanbul United’, was 
filmed to celebrate them. Overall, they did 
vanguard the entire Gezi Park movement and, 
most interestingly, they developed a 
conciliatory character with other groups. 
Through the Gezi Park movement they also 
evolved their social role by earning the 
society’s respect which since then has come to 
consider them not merely socially aware but 
active democratic citizens. Clearly, their 
evolution exceeded Istanbul United and their 
struggle for social concerns remained vigorous 
after the Gezi Park protests. For instance, 
Istanbul United’s fans gathered again and 
chanted slogans like “Thief Tayyip Erdogan, 
Everywhere Corruption, Everywhere 
Bribery”153 during their march in memory of 
Kormaz’s assassination. Until today, the 
football fans remain socially active and are 
regarded as a significant threat to the rule of 
the AKP. Arguably, the Gezi Park movement’s 
spirit remained after the Gezi Park protests. 
The dynamics of these groups transformed the 
Gezi Park movement into an effective platform 
for social collectivity. This platform enabled 
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these two groups to redefine their social role 
within the Turkish society. Moreover, it 
empowered potential groups to redefine 
themselves too. Thereupon, this unprecedented 
opportunity for self-determination transformed 
the dynamics of Turkish contentious politics. 
Ultimately, this transformation can gradually 
lead, the effects of the summer 2017 coup 
notwithstanding, to the creation of a new social 
reality which is characterised by increased 
personal autonomy, political freedom, social 
justice, protection of human rights, and 
encouragement of social mobilisation, all of 
which are integral elements of effective 
citizenship.
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Lady in Red154. 
 
Appendix B: The standing Yonca155. 
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Appendix C: The body chain of mothers to protect their children from the 
police1. 
 
Appendix D: Woman with veil protesting together with feminists2. 
 
                                                 
1 D. Pipes, ‘What Turkey’s Riots Mean’, The Algemeiner [online newspaper], 21 June 2013, 
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Appendix E: Fans of Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray together3. 
 
Appendix F: Fan of Fenerbahce during the police attacks4. 
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Appendix G: Football fans hijacked bulldozer5. 
 
  
                                                 
5 Pato, loc. cit. 
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